We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beautycontest game. Naïve advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social learning trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. We find that subjects who receive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others' past behavior before making their decision do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. A series of simulations prove that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.
Introduction
Before making a decision, many subjects seek advice from others or simply observe what others have been doing in the past. For example, many consumers read customer reviews before buying a new book in an Internet bookstore, or it is quite common to take a curious look into some friends' garages prior to buying a new car. Likewise, before deciding in which assets to invest, people tend to investigate the past performance of the asset or ask their friends about their experience.
In this paper we study the impact of two forms of social learning, naïve advice and observational learning, on the depths of reasoning and the relative performance of subjects with and without access to advice or observational data in an experimental beauty-contest game (Nagel, 1995) . This game has been likened to professional investment activity, since Keynes (1936) has compared investment decisions on financial markets to the beauty-contests run in newspapers at his time (where readers had to decide on which out of several faces they considered to be the most popular among the general readership of the newspaper).
Obviously, both naïve advice and observational learning play an important role for investment decisions, in particular for private investors who seek out advice on and observe past performance of financial assets.
Besides having an application in financial markets, the beauty-contest game is also ideal for studying an individual's depths of reasoning and the performance of subjects who receive advice or observe others compared to those subjects who do not. More generally, the beautycontest game is an excellent tool for analyzing reasoning processes, because (i) it is relatively simple, but still captures all important aspects of an interactive game where it is crucial to anticipate what others do; (ii) learning and reasoning can be observed and studied easily; (iii) performance can be measured directly since in its standard form it is a winner-takes all game; and (iv) social preferences, risk aversion or loss aversion are practically irrelevant, contrary to most other games for which the influence of naïve advice and observational learning have been studied so far.
Although there is an extensive literature on the beauty-contest game 1 , there are only a few recent papers that are closely related to the research questions in this paper. Slonim (2005) examines the influence of experience in a beauty-contest game. He lets experienced subjects (who have already played the game before) compete against inexperienced ones and 1 See, for instance: Nagel (1995) ; Duffy and Nagel (1997) ; Ho et al. (1998) ; Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) ; Güth et al. (2002) ; Camerer et al. (2003) ; Weber (2003) ; Kocher and Sutter (2005) ; Sutter (2005) ; Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006); Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) .
finds that experienced subjects win the game significantly more often in each single period but that the relative advantage of experienced subjects diminishes over time. Our research question differs from Slonim's (2005) in that we are interested in the effects of observing others' past behavior (observational learning) rather than learning by experience.
Furthermore, Slonim (2005) does not study the effects of receiving naïve advice.
Contributions by Sbriglia (2008) and Potamites and Schotter (2007) are most closely related to our paper. Sbriglia (2008) presents a beauty-contest experiment where the winner of each period drops out of the game and has to give an explanation for her choice that is subsequently shown to the remaining participants at the beginning of the next period. The winner is motivated to give reasonable advice by paying her a bonus of 3 Euro if the distance between the participant's choices and the target value is lower in the next period than in the previous one. Sbriglia (2008) finds that the winner's explanations for the remaining players accelerate the learning process and the convergence to the equilibrium considerably, compared to a control setting without an explanation of the winner. Hence, advice (in the form of an explanation for one's choice) seems to increase the depths of reasoning.
In Potamites and Schotter (2007) , all players in a beauty-contest game receive either public or private advice from inexperienced subjects, who are playing the game among themselves after giving advice to other players. The focus of this paper is on quantifying the difference between the observed and the true distribution of subjects' rationality levels. This difference lies in the players' beliefs about the rationality levels of their opponents. Potamites and Schotter (2007) find that meaningful public advice shifts the observed rationality levels towards higher rationality, indicating that public but not private advice influences the beliefs about other players.
Our paper is different from Sbriglia's (2008) and Potamites and Schotter's (2007) in the following aspects: First, we let subjects who receive advice compete against subjects who do not receive advice. Hence, we are able to check whether receiving advice increases one's relative performance, which is not captured by the two papers, because there all members of a group receive advice from the previous period's winner. Our design also allows measuring the monetary "value" of advice. Second, Sbriglia (2008) as well as Potamites and Schotter (2007) do not consider observational learning. Therefore, it is not possible for them to compare the relative effects of naïve advice and observational learning. This comparison is not completely novel, though. Celen et al. (2006) study the impact of naïve advice and observational learning on the processing of information in an information cascade experiment. They find that subjects tend to follow the advice of others, but mostly ignore the past behavior of others (even though both types of information are equally informative in their setup). Besides using a different type of game, our paper is different from Celen et al. (2006) in that access to advice or observational data is asymmetric in our setting. While feature such asymmetry in a game where subjects with advice or observational data play against an (uninformed) computer, our design enables us to compare the behavior of subjects with or without access and quantify the benefits of having access to advice or observational data.
2
Our results indicate that both naïve advice and the observation of past behavior accelerate convergence to the equilibrium significantly. Thus, both types of information have a qualitatively similar effect on convergence. Regarding profits, we find that subjects who observe others' past behavior do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects, whereas subjects receiving advice outperform uninformed subjects consistently. The latter finding indicates a clear advantage of receiving advice over observing others' past behavior.
However, we show in a set of simulations that the information contained in the past behavior of others could have been used much better by applying some simple strategies such as imitating past behavior or best-reply to it.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the beauty-contest game. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 derives predictions. Results are presented in Section 5, using also a recently developed cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) to explain the data. Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing our findings.
The beauty-contest game
In a beauty-contest game n decision-makers i = 1,…,n simultaneously choose a real
. The winner is the participant whose number is closest to a target value x , which is defined as p times the average chosen number, with 0 < p < 1, i.e.
2 In general, the literature on naïve advice and observational learning has, so far, mainly focused on bargaining and coordination games (Chaudhuri et al., , 2009 Schotter and Sopher 2003, 2007) . Naïve advice facilitates coordination and yields higher cooperation levels in battle-of-the-sexes games , minimum games (Chaudhuri et al., 2009 ) and in public goods games . Ultimatum bargaining gets tougher with advice and observation, as it yields lower offers and more rejections (Schotter and Sopher, 2007) . The term naïve advice has been used by Schotter (2003) to describe advice from non-experts.
The winner receives a given prize r > 0, while all other n-1 players get nothing. This game is dominance-solvable by assuming common knowledge of rationality. The process of eliminating weakly dominated strategies starts with the observation that any number higher than 100 p ⋅ is weakly dominated, because 100 p ⋅ is the highest possible winning number.
Given this first step of elimination, it is straightforward to see that the process continues by eliminating all numbers above 2 100 p ⋅ , then all numbers above 3 100 p ⋅ , and so on. After an infinite series of steps of reasoning the number zero remains as the only undominated choice.
All previous experimental studies show that the unraveling process stops, on average, after only a few steps of reasoning. Obviously, this can be due to an insufficient depth of reasoning or due to specific beliefs about the other players' depths of reasoning, or even specific beliefs over the beliefs over the distribution of other players' depths of reasoning, and so on. The interactive component of decision making and the difficulty of belief management are the basis for the intuitive expectation that naïve advice and observational learning might play an important role for the behavior in beauty-contest games as both sources reveal information about other subjects.
Experimental design
The beauty-contest game was played in groups of three persons and repeated for four periods in all experimental treatments. We set the parameter p = 2/3. The prize of winning the game was € 7 in each period. In case of a tie the prize was shared equally among those who tied. All participants received a show-up fee of € 3. After each period subjects were informed about the three numbers chosen in their group, the average number and the target value x .
Three treatments of this basic game were implemented.
1. Control-treatment. In this treatment subjects played the beauty-contest game as described above. At the end of the experiment, participants in Control were asked to fill in an advice sheet that should contain the following three items: (i) a suggested number for period 1, (ii) a brief statement why this number should be chosen, and (iii) a descriptive strategy how to choose one's numbers in periods 2 to 4. Participants in Control were informed that these advice sheets would be used in subsequent sessions with advice. Note that participants in
Control were only asked to fill in an advice sheet after they had completed the beauty-contest game themselves in order to avoid any confounding influence of writing advice sheets on their own decisions. To incentivize advice-giving, participants in Control were told that four randomly selected advice sheets would be distributed to participants in later sessions such that only one out of three group members in these later sessions would receive advice. If a particular subject's advice sheet were to be distributed in a later session, this subject would earn three times the amount of the money one randomly drawn participant who had access to the particular advice sheet made in the four-period game. Profits for advice for the randomly selected four participants in Control were paid after the advice sessions had been carried out.
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Since advisors benefit from giving valuable advice with positive probability, the procedure is incentive compatible. Furthermore, we did everything to ensure credibility of the procedure, and given the elaborate advice statements, we are sure that the incentive mechanism worked well. Note finally that advice-giving was anonymous, which means that the advisee did not get any information about his or her specific advisor and vice versa. Table 2 and will be referred to as advice in the following. To make the procedure as credible as possible we distributed the Xerox-copied hand-written sheets instead of providing the advice statements in any other form (e.g. electronically on the screen). We used the same four sheets of advice in each group in order to keep OneAdv and OneHist as comparable as possible for a comparative assessment of the impact of naïve advice and the observation of history. For the same reason we decided to use four sheets of advice -instead of any other number -because subjects in OneHist received information on four periods; this is as close as we believe one can get. Like in OneHist subjects in OneAdv were informed that only one group member would receive the advice sheets, and this member was not unveiled when all group members received feedback on the chosen numbers. Since 2/3 of the average of all numbers is the target, the target number is not too high (between 10 and 20). However, some of the participants do not know this, and the target in Period 1 is above the targets of later periods.
Decrease the number from period to period.
The participants realize that they should decrease the numbers (actually, the target should converge to zero). However, you cannot count on the others: set a number between 13 and 21.
Advice sheet 2 13.5
Most of the time the game starts with a low number.
Slowly increase the number from period to period. Increase the number by not more than 10 in one step.
Advice sheet 3 0
To see how the other participants behave. If the others think that the people in the group are "rational", they should also choose zero.
You can see whether the other participants know what the game is about or whether they just guess. If they guess, you should set around the target number of the previous period. If they do not guess, set zero again.
Advice sheet 4 30
Since there are three participants, the average number out of 0 -100 is 33. Hence, people like to choose this number. However, the average will be multiplied by 2/3, which will reduce the target value. This means that a number below 33 might be closest to the target value.
There is tendency to decrease numbers, which results from the multiplication of the average by 2/3. Hence, lower numbers should come closer to the final value. 6 In Appendix B in the supplementary material we provide all 33 sheets of advice that we collected in Control.
We let a student in one of our classes draw the four advice sheets out of the 33.
All experimental sessions were run at the University of Innsbruck (using zTree, Fischbacher, 2007) . A total of 96 students in their first and second year participated. None of them had ever attended a game theory class or participated in a beauty-contest experiment before. Sessions lasted approximately 30 minutes, and subjects earned € 12.33 on average (including the show-up fee of € 3).
Predictions
The possible access to advice or history obviously does not change the equilibrium prediction of the game when assuming common knowledge of rationality. However, the behavior observed in beauty-contests does not support standard predictions. In order to derive alternative predictions, it, thus, makes sense to rely on empirical models that assume (at least partly) bounded rationality. Relaxing the assumptions of full rationality and common knowledge of it may then yield advice or history a valuable source for a decision maker, because they convey information about the average depths of reasoning and beliefs in the population.
One prominent model to explain behavior in the beauty-contest game has been proposed by Camerer et al. (2004) and is known as the cognitive hierarchy model (CHM). In general, this model is based on the assumption of step-level reasoning, meaning that subjects may differ in the number of steps of iterated thinking (i.e. iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies). A step-zero player is assumed to randomize from the available strategy space. A step-one player plays best response to step-zero players, but disregards the existence of players with higher steps of reasoning. More generally, a step-d player responds optimally to lower-step players. Hence, the cognitive hierarchy model retains the best-response characteristic of standard game-theoretic equilibria (with the exception of zero-step players), but weakens equilibrium properties such as belief and choice consistency.
More specifically, the CHM assumes that the frequency of players applying a different level of steps of reasoning is distributed according to a Poisson distribution with mean and variance τ. Thus, d steps of reasoning are assumed to occur with probability
.
Using several data sets from experimental beauty-contest games, Camerer Gneezy (2005) shows that bidding behavior in auctions can also be captured by the CHM and that the estimated τ for auctions is close to the one for beauty-contest games (see also Kovac et al., 2008 , on the latter).
For the sake of succinctness we are not going into the details of the CHM here. Rather, we will assume for our analysis in the results section that subjects behave according to the model. 8 In the following, we would like to concentrate on deriving predictions for the behavior of subjects who receive either advice or history. Since the CHM is a static model (that does not imply predictions for behavior in later periods), we will only consider behavior in the first period.
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Let us start with treatment OneHist. Our analysis rests upon the assumption that the population distributions of choices in Control and OneHist are the same. Since subjects were invited from a large subject pool (of over 3000 students) and since assignment to treatments was random, this assumption is rather innocuous.
Let x % be the number chosen by the subject who knows the history (from the Controltreatment) and let 1 x and 2 x be the numbers of the two other group members in OneHist.
Recall that p denotes the factor that multiplies the group average and n the number of group members. The group member with history will win if his number is closest (or equally close) to the target value, i.e. if the following two conditions are satisfied:
Since it is the absolute difference to the target value that determines winning or not, we have to perform a case-wise analysis that considers all possible combinations of positive or negative deviations from the target value. The details of this analysis are relegated to Appendix C in the supplementary material, and we present only the main result here. For unimodal distributions of the depths of reasoning (like for instance the Poisson or the normal distribution) it can be shown that choosing * h x maximizes the probability of winning, where
The variable h 1 in equation (3) denotes the average number shown in the history for period 1 (see Table 1 ), which is used as the best estimator for the numbers chosen by the other two group members, i.e. for suggestions for which numbers to choose. Therefore, there is no reason a priori to expect any of both sources to be more valuable than the other. Table 3 reports the medians, means and standard deviations of chosen numbers in the three treatments. Notice in all treatments the typical pattern of chosen numbers to decline over periods (p < 0.01 for any two consecutive periods and for any treatment 11 ; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). In the first two periods, the chosen numbers do not differ significantly across treatments. However, in periods 3 and 4 the numbers are significantly higher in Control than in the other two treatments (p < 0.05; two-sided Mann-Whitney Utest). Hence, it seems that social learning (in the form of receiving advice or history) triggers significantly faster convergence to the equilibrium in the later periods of the experiment. 10 To keep the notation simple we suppress the period subscript in cases where it is not necessary.
Results
11 Obviously, the letter p denotes p-values in the context of test results. Note that we have used the same letter to denote the factor that multiplies the average of chosen numbers in the game, because it is often also referred to as p-beauty-contest game (see, e.g., Ho et al., 1998) . N is the number of groups (with 3 members), i.e. independent observations. In OneAdv three subjects did not show up, which yielded one group less than in the other treatments.
In Table 4 we compare the median and mean choices of the informed as well as the uninformed group members. In OneHist we find that the informed members (those who see the history) choose significantly lower numbers in periods 1 and 2 (p < 0.05; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test 12 ), yet there is no significant difference in periods 3 and 4. In
OneAdv the informed members (who receive advice) submit significantly smaller numbers in every single period (p < 0.05; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). The findings in Table 4 are supported by an estimation of the depths of reasoning of informed and uninformed subjects in OneHist and OneAdv. Applying the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) yields the estimated values of τ in Table 5 . We see for the
Control-treatment that the estimated depth of reasoning is slightly above one and, thus, in the typical range. In treatments OneHist and OneAdv the depths of reasoning of informed group members is substantially higher than those of uninformed members. One noteworthy feature of the data in Table 4 is the finding that the numbers chosen in the first period by uninformed members are not significantly different from those chosen in
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Control. This holds true for both OneHist and OneAdv (compare the entries in the rows "uninformed" of OneHist and OneAdv in Table 4 with the entry in row "Control" of Table 3 ).
From that one can conclude that, on average, uninformed group members do not take into account the fact that another group member is provided with either advice or history. An immediate implication of this finding is that using the information contained in advice or history should increase the likelihood of winning the beauty-contest game. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of this issue.
The impact of history on performance in OneHist
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 shows the median numbers chosen by group members with access to history and those without. The empty circles indicate the target value contained in history (see Table 1 ). The right-hand panel of Figure 1 displays the average profits of informed and uninformed group members.
13 In order to estimate the depths of reasoning of several subsamples of players we search for the parameter τ that Note from the chosen numbers that the median number of group members with access to history is very close to the suggested target in each period. However, no subject with history information ever simply imitated the target value shown in Table 1 . Furthermore, on average, informed subjects do not take into account the influence of their own number on the group's target number. Recall from the previous section that subjects with access to history should choose * ( 1) /( ) h x p n h n p = ⋅ − ⋅ − % in the first period, which would be 18.79. Yet, the median is 21.0 in the first period. While in periods 1 and 2 the median numbers of subjects with history information are nevertheless significantly smaller than those of uninformed subjects, the latter choose smaller numbers in periods 3 and 4, meaning that subjects with information neglect the dynamics of chosen number in their decisions and instead focus on the information contained in history.
Subjects with history information win the game significantly more often in period 1 and, thus, earn more money than uninformed subjects (p < 0.05; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test), but there is no significant difference in later periods (p > 0.6 in periods 2-4), and the overall earnings of informed (€ 11.76) and uninformed (€ 8.16) group members are not significantly different either (p > 0.4).
5.2
The impact of advice on performance Figure 2 shows in the left-hand panel that group members receiving advice choose on average lower numbers than uninformed group members in each period. Recall from the previous section that we expected subjects with advice to choose * a x a = % = 17.63 in the first period. In fact, we observe a slightly higher average number. However, in terms of profits, group members with naïve advice clearly outperform the other two members in each single period (with p < 0.05 in periods 1, 2, and 4; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test). Overall earnings are also significantly higher for informed (€ 17.03) than for uninformed (€ 5.48) subjects (p < 0.01). 
Figure 2 Median numbers and profits in OneAdv

The comparative effects of advice and history
Comparing the impact of advice and history we have found that both types of information lead in the aggregate to significantly lower numbers in periods 3 and 4, compared to the Control-treatment and, thus, to quicker convergence to the equilibrium. Concerning the performance of those subjects endowed with either advice or history we have found that access to advice yields much higher payoffs than access to history (17.03€ in OneAdv vs.
11.67€ in OneHist)
. Yet, the difference in earnings is not significant (p = 0.16; two-sided Mann Whitney U-test).
Contrary to the actual payoffs for subjects with either advice or history, we had expected history to have a stronger relative influence on the winning probability for the following reasons: The information in history is easier to interpret and it is based on a larger sample, and this is known to subjects receiving history. Furthermore, some pieces of advice contained explicitly wrong statements, such as advice 3 suggesting that "Since there are three participants, the average number out of 0-100 is 33", or advice 2 proposing to increase rather than decrease the chosen numbers over time. While statements in advice simply suggest that there is a "tendency to decrease numbers" or that "you should decrease the number from period to period", the information in history carries precise data by how much average numbers and target values decrease over time.
Given that the information in history provided a single number for each period, whereas advice contained four different suggestions, we would also have expected a smaller variance of the numbers chosen in OneHist than in OneAdv. Yet, the variances (see Table 4 ) are not significantly different (Levene test, p > 0.3), but on average even smaller in OneAdv than in
OneHist. In sum, it seems that access to advice is more useful than the information contained in history. The following subsection examines why this might be the case.
Simulations on how history could have been used better
Given the rather poor performance of group members with access to history we were interested in whether some straightforward strategies for the use of the information contained in history could have yielded higher profits for the members with history. We will consider three different strategies: (i) pure imitation of the target values contained in history, (ii) bestreply to the target values in history, and (iii) dynamic best-reply to the target values.
Running simulations on the strategies of the informed group members requires some assumptions regarding the choices of the uninformed group members. The first period choices of uninformed members can be taken as they are because they are completely independent.
Yet, for periods 2 to 4 we have to assume how uninformed subjects would have reacted to the different (i.e. simulated) numbers of the informed members. We have decided to calculate the simulated choice of the two group members without access to history by simply applying an adjustment factor n x Note that we observe t f in OneHist and apply it to the simulations.
Simulation 1 uses the simplest of all possible strategies: imitation of the target value stated in history. Hence, we assume that the informed members choose the following number in each period t: , Figure 3 shows the hypothetical profits for this simulation. Using this simple strategy, subjects with history would have earned significantly more than the uninformed subjects in periods 1 and 4 as well as over the whole experiment (p < 0.05 in all cases; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). Recall that in the real sessions (see Figure 1) subjects with history did not earn more than uninformed subjects over the entire experiment (nor in period 4). Hence, simple imitation would have yielded higher earnings than subjects actually achieved. Simulation 3 assumes a dynamic best-reply strategy of informed subjects where they do not only take into account the information in history, but also the dynamics of chosen numbers in their own group. Hence, in period 1 we let subjects with history choose the target value for period 1. In later periods, informed subjects are assumed to calculate the convergence -or adjustment-rate -from period t to period t+1 from history and apply it to the target number of their own group in period t in order to determine the number for period t+1.
Thus, the simulated numbers of informed subjects are as follows (where 1 − t x refers to the average number observed in the informed subject's group in period t-1). Figure 5 shows the hypothetical earnings for a dynamic best-reply strategy. Informed subjects would have earned significantly more money than uninformed subjects in periods 1, 2 and 4 as well as overall (p < 0.01 for period 1 and overall, p < 0.1 for periods 2 and 4; twosided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). Comparing hypothetical profits in the three simulations with actual ones in OneHist (see Figure 1 ) we find that the overall hypothetical profits are significantly higher in each of the three simulations than the actual profits (p < 0.07 for any simulation in comparison to actual payoffs; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). This clearly indicates that subjects with access to history were not able to make the most out of it. Even rather straightforward strategies like imitation or best-reply would have performed better than the actual play of informed subjects in the experiment. Of course, this statement depends on our assumption about the behavior of uninformed subjects in periods 2-4. Therefore, it is probably noteworthy that the average hypothetical profits of informed subjects were about 20% higher than the actual ones already in period 1, for which we plugged in the actually observed choices of uninformed subjects.
At the end of this subsection we would like to provide some further evidence on the possible use of the suggestions in advice. Since each sheet of advice contained a proposed number for period 1, we can check whether following any of them separately would have paid off. Figure 6 shows the actual average profits of informed subjects as well as the hypothetical profits if informed subjects had picked any of the four numbers stated in advice. Note that advice 2 suggests choosing the equilibrium, i.e. zero. Yet, this would have yielded the lowest average earnings for informed subjects. Note also that the actual average earnings of informed subjects are higher than if they had chosen any particular number. This seems to indicate that subjects receiving advice do not focus on a single number, but rather try to form a synthesis of several pieces of advice, and this also contributes to the relatively better performance of subjects with advice than those with history.
Figure 6
Hypothetical average profits if subjects had followed one of the suggestions in advice
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the effects of social learning on behavior in an experimental beauty-contest game. In particular we have examined how the access to observational data and how receiving advice from others influences decision making in this game and whether the access pays off or not in terms of profits in comparison to those subjects without access. A noteworthy feature of our experiment is that we have set up groups in which only one member got access to either advice or history. This approach with asymmetric access to advice or history and the use of the beauty-contest game distinguish our paper from previous papers on social learning (Chaudhuri et al., , 2009 Schotter and Sopher, 2003, 2007; Celen et al., 2006; Sbriglia, 2008) . As a consequence of our setup, we have been able to compare the performance of informed versus uninformed subjects, but also of subjects receiving advice versus subjects with access to history information.
Receiving advice and observing historical data has been shown to have a large and significant impact on the probability of winning in the very first period. As such, both sources of information seem to be a substitute for own previous experience of the game. Camerer and Ho (2002) and Slonim (2005) , for instance, have shown that experienced subjects (who have played a beauty-contest before) approach the equilibrium much faster and outperform inexperienced subjects. Similarly, the effects of advice and history are related to the evidence on group decision making in the beauty-contest game. (Inexperienced) Groups win the beauty-contest game significantly more often than (inexperienced) individuals (Kocher et al., 2006) due to the experience they can gain in the group discussion. Given these similarities in findings, our paper can establish a link between several lines of research that have not been closely related so far.
Another interesting finding of our paper is the asymmetry of advice and history as regards their longer-run impact on winning probabilities. Whereas subjects with access to advice are able to earn significantly more money over the entire experiment in comparison to their uninformed group members, subjects who know the history of previous (but unrelated)
sessions are not able to earn significantly more than their uninformed counterparts within the group.
In a particular sense this finding is reminiscent of previous studies which have established that advice has a stronger influence on decisions than mere observation (see, for example, Schotter and Sopher, 2003 , 2007 , Celen et al., 2006 , or Chauduri et al., 2006 . However, in these previous studies either -as already mentioned before -all subjects in a group had access to the additional information, or they were playing against a computer who, as the subjects were informed, followed clearly predictable decision rules, while in our case we let informed subjects directly compete against uninformed human subjects. In accordance with the literature, we may conclude that words (i.e. advice) have a stronger impact on behavior and the probability of winning a beauty-contest game than actions (i.e. history). It seems that subjects who receive advice think more carefully about the decision making task than subjects with access to history. The divergent opinions expressed in the four sheets of advice may actually support higher depths of reasoning as they force a subject to digest the different suggestions and build an own opinion. This is not to say that subjects with access to history do not think about the problem themselves. Recall that no subject with history information ever simply imitated the target value shown in Table 1 . Our simulations at the end of the results section show, however, that subjects with history information could have earned more money by doing so (and even more money by using a best-reply strategy).
Of course, one has to be careful with directly extrapolating our results from a stylized experiment to real-world phenomena. Nevertheless, our experiment provides new arguments why people in reality often seem to prefer non-expert advice over history statistics. They probably prefer the brain-teaser of different opinions to derive an own strategy instead of history information, and our experiment shows that they may be right in doing so.
Supplementary material accompanying "Social learning in beauty-contest games" by Martin Kocher, Matthias Sutter and Florian Wakolbinger
Appendix A: Instructions (translated from German)
[The following instructions have been read aloud prior to the sessions. In all sessions, we used the same description of the beauty-contest game. However, parts of the instructions are specific to particular treatments. This will be indicated by italic letters.]
Welcome and thank you for participating! Please do not talk to other participants from now on. This experiment is about economic decision-making. You will earn "real" money, which will be paid out right after the experiment, including a show-up fee of € 3.
Groups and number of periods
In this experiment we will randomly form groups of three persons. The composition of groups will remain fixed and group members will interact for four periods. Your decisions will remain anonymous, i.e. you will not learn the identity of the other group members nor will they learn your identity.
The decision
You are a member of a group of three persons. At the beginning of each period, each person chooses a number x i out of the range from 0 to 100, including 0 and 100. The number does not necessarily have to be an integer, but may not have more than two digits after the comma.
Your payoff depends on the absolute difference between your number and a target value. The group member whose number is closest to the target value of a given period receives € 7, the others receive zero in the respective period. If the numbers of two or three group members are equally close to the target value, then those participants share the price of € 7 equally and receive € 3.5, respectively € 2.33.
S2
Calculation of the target value
To calculate the target value we first compute the average of the three numbers x i in your group. Then, the average is multiplied by 2/3. This yields the target value. In mathematical notation: Choose 27 in Period 1 Why: Since 2/3 of the average of all numbers is the target, the target number is not too high (between 10 and 20). However, some of the participants do not know this, and the target in Period 1 is above the targets of later periods. Strategy: Decrease the number from period to period. The participants realize that they should decrease the numbers (actually, the target should converge to zero). However, you cannot count on the others: set a number between 13 and 21.
Advice 2 Choose 13.5 in Period 1 Why: Most of the time the game starts with a low number. Strategy: Slowly increase the number from period to period. Increase the number by not more than 10 in one step.
Advice 3
Choose 0 in Period 1 Why: To see how the other participants behave. If the others think that the people in the group are "rational", they should also choose zero. Strategy: You can see whether the other participants know what the game is about or whether they just guess. If they guess, you should set around the target number of the previous period. If they do not guess, set zero again.
Advice 4
Choose 30 in Period 1 Why: Since there are three participants, the average number out of 0 -100 is 33. Hence, people like to choose this number. However, the average will be multiplied by 2/3, which will reduce the target value. This means that a number below 33 might be closest to the target value. Strategy: There is tendency to decrease numbers, which results from the multiplication of the average by 2/3. Hence, lower numbers should come closer to the final value.
B2: Advice sheets that have not been distributed in OneAdv
Advice 5 Choose 25 in Period 1 Why: Never set above 50. The chance will be higher, because in total there will be some 50 points. Most people do not set that high numbers. The first time is the most difficult. Strategy: Normally, the number declines, since after the first period, every player sets the target of the previous round. The NEW target is thus somewhere around 2/3 of the OLD target.
Advice 6
Choose 10 in Period 1 Why: You are in a group with some other players. Some will choose high, some low numbers or zero. Therefore, the probability that you win is highest if you set 10. Strategy: If you really win with number 10, then repeat your guess in the next round. If you realize that the others adjust and set 10 as well, then choose a lower number (i.e. 7). If you do not win in the first round, then set the number of the winner in the second round and in the following rounds a lower number.
Advice 24
Choose 26.55 in Period 1 Why: You have the choice between 0 and 100. One could assume that one of the three sets around 50 and the other one has already realized that and therefore sets only 15-20. Thus it is best to be in the center.
Strategy:
Observe what the others do. The number tends to decline. The number should always be set lower, since the other players will as well always set lower numbers. One orientates herself to the target value.
Advice 25
Choose 0 in Period 1 Why: The higher the number you choose, the lower is the probability to reach the target value. If everyone always sets 0, then everyone in the group will win something in every period. Strategy: The tendency of numbers goes down, and numbers between 0 and 10 are recommended. The closer to zero, the better. Try also decimal digits, not just integer numbers.
Advice 26
Choose 26 in Period 1 Why: If on average everyone sets half of the highest feasible number (50); (50+50+50)/3 = 50; 2/3 times 50 = 36. Since experience shows that the other players tend to set lower numbers, set 26. Strategy: Try to be the player with the lowest bid. In any case, choose a number below 40.
Advice 27
Choose 35 in Period 1 Why: Theoretically, everyone sets 50. Target value ~ 32. If 2 persons set only ~ 30, then you loose, if not, then you win. Strategy: 18, because now all players try to set 35. You win because of the reaction, see where the experiment goes to, you decline to be closer to the theoretical target value, because the others try to cooperate, always underbid the target value.
Advice 28
Choose 50 in Period 1 Why: It is safest, lies in the center. You do not know what the other participants choose. Strategy: Then 25, then I would take 75. And have always a look which numbers the other participants in your group take, and choose them next time. This is more important than 25+75.
Advice 29
Choose 0 in Period 1 Why: If everyone has understood the experiment, everyone will set 0, because then everyone will win something (although the prize will be divided by 3). Even if not everyone has understood in the first round, the probability that there is a small target value is high, and you have a chance of winning. Strategy: Always set 0. If everyone thinks so, everyone earns 4 times 7/3 = 9.30. If not everyone follows the system, the target value declines not proportionally (i.e. 20, 10, 4, 0.9). Good luck.
Advice 30
Choose 30.1 in Period 1 Why: 66.6 is the highest feasible number. If you assume that everyone knows that, everyone will choose a small number. Therefore 30.1. At least in that range or lower. Strategy: Always set lower than the number that has won in the previous period. Last number times 2/3 >= next choice.
Advice 31
Choose ~20 in Period 1 Why: If everyone would set 100, then the average would be 66.6. Thus, it is better to set lower than 100. Everyone will do so. Therefore, set even lower. You could go on with that infinitely until 0. Since not everyone thinks so thoroughly, 20 is a good starting point. Strategy: The number will continuously decline. The other participants will learn from the results of the previous periods.
S8
Advice 32 Choose 25.33 in Period 1 Why: According to probability, the 3 participants set 150 in total. This number divided by 3 is 50 per participant. The target value is 2/3 of it, 33.67. Because you want to approximate it, set 33.67 -5.67 (your difference of 50 -33.67 -x) -2.67.
Strategy:
In what follows all players will decrease their points. You as well! A little more than the others. Please: Set your new number below the target value of the previous period. times 2/3 times 0.9. This means: Target value Period 3 i.e. 27, then times 2/3 = 18 times 0.9 is 16.2.
Advice 33
Choose 10 in Period 1 Why: a low number increases the chance, because my opponents set only in this range of numbers, at least very often (3 out of 4 times). Strategy: Orientate yourself to the numbers of the others. In my case there was a tendency to continuously decline the numbers.
